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Abstract 
The central puzzle addressed in this paper is: On the one hand we observe that public and 
academic debates in the newest round of the migration-development nexus address mostly 
one-way flows, the transfer of resources from North or West to South and East. These trans-
fers include financial remittances, human capital, knowledge and even so-called social remit-
tances, such as the export of democracy and human rights. The newest round of the migra-
tion-development debate, like the older ones in the 1960s and 1980s, is couched in terms of 
development and development cooperation. On the other hand, studies taking a transna-
tional approach suggest that we do not see one-way traffic but two-way flows. There is the 
silent backwash of remittances, that is, a massive flow of resources from South to North. Ex-
amples include student tuition fees, "reverse remittances", such as families of migrants pay-
ing for their kinfolk to legalize their status. In addressing this puzzle, this paper analyses the 
migration-development nexus between North/West and South/East in using a transnational 
lens. The paper addresses three questions: First, the question is what is new and what is old 
about the new "mantra" of the migration-development nexus. Second, as to sustained cross-
border transactions the question comes up whose transnational ties and what kind of trans-
national ties are good for development? Third, one of the glaring questions is why the new 
enthusiasm on migration and development now? How is it connected to changing paradigms 
in development thinking and the overall discursive embedding in the trinity of community & 
civil society, market and the state. How is it connected to changing geopolitical formations 
and forms of migration control after the end of the Cold War? 
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Preliminaries 
Public debates and research on the two-way relationship between migration & development 
– the migration-development nexus – has increased considerably over the past years. To be 
more precise, it has experienced yet another climax after two previous ones, in the 1960s 
and 1980s. Yet there is very little systematic thought given to what is “new” around this time. 
I argue that the current debates around the migration & development nexus should be ap-
proached from a transnational angle, that is, looking at the emergence of a new transnational 
agent in development discourse – intermittently called “migrants”, “diaspora”, or “transna-
tional community”. Increasingly, the cross-border ties of geographically mobile persons and 
collectives are taken to the centre of attention. And national states1, local governments, inter- 
and supranational organisations and development agencies seek to co-opt and establish ties 
to such agents who are engaged in sustained and continuous cross-border relationships on a 
personal, collective and organisational level. Also, and this is crucial for any kind of scientific 
endeavour, the emergence of this new type of development agent can be tackled by a decid-
edly transnational methodology. Only then can we hope to look at what is usually called “de-
velopment” in both North and South. What this could mean in terms of concepts and re-
search strategies is open for debate at our conference. In short, the starting hunch of this 
conference is that instead of repeating the “new mantra” (Ratha 2003) of migration and de-
velopment, which is simply a retake of previous debates in familiar terms, it is useful to en-
gage in two activities: first, to question the significance of the current debates, their econo-
mistic bias and their disjointed nature when it comes to North and South; and second, to ex-
plore opportunities for a methodologically more sophisticated approach to transnational link-
ages. 
 
What are the Elements of the New Enthusiasm”?  
The new enthusiasm around migration and development hinges on a number of strong 
claims which in turn raise serious questions. What are these claims? They can be summa-
                                               
1
 Instead of nation-states I use in the following two terms. I speak of states to indicate various levels of statehood 
(local, regional, national, inter- and supranational). And I use the term national states when referring to the ideo-
logical claim that one nation occupies one distinct territory. The latter is not often found in actually existing states 
with the possible exception of Iceland. The adjective national refers to the claim, not to its actual realisation. 
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rized in the statement that the flows of money, knowledge and universal ideas – called remit-
tances – can have a positive effect on what is called development. Obviously, this is not a 
new insight and a retake of familiar debates which have been on the public and academic 
agendas on and off since the 1960s. The first claim is that financial remittances carry a huge 
potential for poverty reduction and local investment, especially since remittances very often 
are resistant or even counter-cyclic to economic recession. The amount of remittances trans-
ferred to developing countries flowing through officially sanctioned channels such as banks 
or money transfer services are estimated to have increased sharply over the past years – at 
$167 billion for 2005, up from about $40 billion in 1990 (IOM 2005: 270). This is at least dou-
ble the sum of the OECD’s annual Overseas Development Assistance (ODA). Second, de-
spite the fact that financial remittances still stand at the core, in this new round of enthusi-
asm, indeed euphoria, more emphasis is placed on the transfer of human capital and social 
ideas & practices from North to South. Now the perception of costs and benefits have 
changed with shifts in ideas, from “brain drain” in the 1970s to “brain gain” in the 1990s (cf. 
Guarnizo, working paper). Nowadays, we supposedly find more win-win situations for mobile 
persons, states and others. And even newer is the concept of “social remittances”, the flow of 
ideas and practices which are “good” and to which nobody in his or her right moral mind 
would object: human rights, gender equity, and democracy – to name only the most obvious 
ones. Third, part of the “new mantra” – it has to be repeated a lot to be believed – is the de-
sirability of temporary labour migration because of the hope that temporary migrants transmit 
a higher percentage of their income than permanent immigrants. This view has especially 
been propounded by Kofi Anan’s Global Commission on International Migration in its 2005 
report (GCIM 2005), which was given visibility by the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration 
and Development in 2006. Overall, these three broad optimistic claims are tied to migration 
control. It is the hope expressed by political institutions such as the EU Commission that, on 
the long run, economic growth supported by financial and partly knowledge and social remit-
tances will reduce “migration pressure” in the sending countries (EU Commission 2005).  
Yet, even a cursory glance at this new enthusiasm raises a number of obvious questions 
which cast doubt on this optimistic agenda, relating to three sets of questions. 
First, the question is what is new and what is old about the new mantra on the migration-
development nexus. Actually, after decades of research there is a consensus on the conse-
quences of migration on development, at least among economists: whilst the economic im-
pacts for receiving countries, mostly OECD states, are “clearly positive”, for sending coun-
tries the benefits are less clear-cut and heavily contested (Delgado Wise, working paper). 
And most studies conclude that development in the countries of origin is not a result of mi-
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gration and remittances and investments by migrants. Instead, development – or the right 
institutional conditions – is a prerequisite for migrants to invest and to meaningfully remit.2 
These results have been repeated over and again. Therefore, there is a dire need to histori-
cize the discourses on the migration-development nexus (cf. de Haas, working paper). 
Second, as to sustained cross-border transactions the question comes up whose transna-
tional ties and what kind of transnational ties are good for development? Lately, terms such 
as “diaspora” and “transnational communities” are not only used by scholars, politicians and 
bureaucrats in both emigration and immigration regions. But apparently, some transnational 
transactions are usually seen as negative in public discourse. Just think of fundamentalist 
Muslims who do not want to become “like us”, or think of refugee or diaspora warriors who 
want to establish new states by force. This is also the case for return migrants in regions 
such as Latin America or South Asia. For example, women return migrants may be perceived 
as threats to established patriarchal orders when claiming to acquire property and earn their 
own income (Dannecker, working paper). In short, the new enthusiasm overlooks the rene-
gotiation of boundaries and political conflicts associated with transnational transactions, such 
as class, professional, ethnic and gendered hierarchies (cf. Piper, working paper). In order to 
do so, we need to take a closer look at the prospects of taking a transnational angle and de-
liberate transnational methodology. 
Third, one of the glaring questions is why the new enthusiasm on migration and development 
now? How is it connected to changing paradigms in development thinking and the overall 
discursive embedding in the trinity of community & civil society, market and the state. How is 
it connected to changing geopolitical formations and forms of migration control after the end 
of the Cold War? 
 
What is “old” and what is “new”? The History of Thinking on the 
Migration-Development Nexus 
Taking a time frame of about 50 years, the fundamental claims associated with the new mi-
gration-development enthusiasm are not so new. From a simple cost-benefit point of view the 
                                               
2
 For a rather early formulation of this point, summarizing empirical insights from the 1970s, see the contributions 
to International Migration Review, Vol. 16, No. 4, 1982, Special Issue: International Migration and Development. 
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basic idea says that the flow of emigrants and the loss of brains are partly or wholly compen-
sated by a reverse flow of money, ideas and knowledge.  
The following three phases of the nexus can be distinguished.3 It is interesting, yet not sur-
prising, that the conceptualization of the nexus between migration and development mirrors 
the dominant economic development paradigms; economics being the leading and most 
conspicuous discipline in conceptualizing development. 
 
Phase 1: Migration and Development – Remittances and Return 
In phase 1 during the 1960s public policy emphasized the “labour gaps” in the North and 
“development” in the South. The latter was supposed to result from financial remittances, 
return migration and the subsequent transfer of human capital (Kindleberger 1967). This view 
clearly corresponded to overall economic modernization concepts and to a belief that state 
capacity could shape economic growth. Moreover, it was congruent with the economic text-
book mantra which suggests that emigration of surplus labour from underdeveloped areas 
leads to a new equilibrium between capital and labour (see Lewis 1954): If labour goes 
North, labour scarcities in the South then create inflow of capital – and eventually economic 
development in the South (cf. Hamilton and Whaley 1984). 
 
Phase 2: Underdevelopment and Migration – Poverty and Brain Drain 
In phase 2 during much of the 1970s and 1980s the term development came to be replaced 
by “dependency” as a structural condition of the periphery dominated by a centre, and “un-
derdevelopment” as its inevitable result. This period, in which dependency theory and later 
on world systems theory à la Immanuel Wallerstein criticized modernization theory (Waller-
stein 1974), the nexus was partly seen the other way around in terms of assumed causality, 
                                               
3
 Of course, aspects of migration and phenomena which after the late 1940s have been called development fig-
ured much earlier than the 1960s. In their seminal work on The Polish Peasant (1927) William Thomas and 
Florian Znaniecki talk in detail about “the role of supra-territorial organisations” (Volume 3). Thomas and 
Znaniecki begin their analysis with the attempts of Polish-American priests to bring together the representatives of 
the Polish colonies in America (Polonia Americana) and manage the common affairs of the American Poles, and 
then go on to discuss the role of Catholic, nationalist, socialist and humanitarian organisations in structuring both 
adaptation in the United States and what later would be called modernization in Poland. However, in explicit ways 
the term “development” was not connected to migration in academic and public discourses until the 1960s. 
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not from migration to development but from underdevelopment to migration (for an example, 
see Portes and Walton 1981). In terms of public policy, one of the central issues was not 
financial remittances – remember that most European countries stopped recruitment, closed 
their main gates and kept only side doors open for selected categories in the 1970s and 
1980s – but the issue of “brain drain”. In a dependency perspective underdevelopment led to 
the loss of highly-skilled who migrated from the periphery to the centres in the dependent 
world and above all into industrialized countries. This out-migration, in turn, was thought to 
contribute to even more underdevelopment and increased migration flows through asymmet-
ric distribution of benefits and resources (cf. Martin 1991). Evidence for this thesis is easy to 
spot, also nowadays. For example, in 2005, between a third and half of the so-called devel-
oping world’s science and technology personnel lived in OECD countries (Khadria, working 
paper). And it is almost needless to say that a differentiated view of the movement of brains 
indeed has proven such “brain strain hotspots” (Lowell et al. 2004), such as the health care 
sector in Sub-saharan Africa, while countries developing quickly along economic lines, such 
as Taiwan, South Korea and the People’s Republic of China, could change the situation into 
“reverse brain drain” (Zweig 2006). 
 
Phase 3: Migration and Co-development – The Celebration of Circulation  
In phase 3, since the 1990s, the idea of what in French has been called co-développement 
best describes the public policy approaches of immigration countries to the migration-
development nexus, at least those propagated by several states such as France, the Nether-
lands, the UK and international organisations such as the World Bank. Originally the term 
described local level development activities but soon came to encompass a broader migrati-
on-development strategy. The term co-development connotes a reversal of the nexus and 
has led us back to a more optimistic view, akin to the 1960s. International migration is sup-
posed to fuel development in South and East – the “Global South” – this time not only via 
financial remittances and human capital, but knowledge flows more generally and social re-
mittances (Maimbo and Ratha 2005): There seems to be a belief that more circulation of la-
bour fosters more development by the way of remittances, hence the policy recommendation 
of the Global Commission to increase opportunities for short-term labour migration (GCIM 
2005).  
 
As this short sketch suggests, different directions of causality within the migration-
development nexus were emphasized in the three periods mentioned.  
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Interestingly, none of these discourses took note of the most obvious linkage, namely the 
well-established economic relationship between economic development and migration, that 
is, that processes of Western-style industrial-economic development are usually being ac-
companied by emigration as a sort of inevitable by-product (Faist 2000: 160-162). Quite to 
the contrary, economic development, as measured in conventional terms such as growth in 
GDP, is likely to produce even more migrants on the short- and mid-term.  
 
What is New? Migrants as Transnational Agents – Transnational 
Methodology 
While in phase 1 just mentioned policymakers and analysts only could think of remittances 
and return migration as a way of transferring resources across borders, in the third period the 
landscape of alternatives has widened in an era called globalization, network society, or 
world society – an era of ever-increasing circulation. All of the new terms such as co-
development point to the emergence of new transnational agents, that is, “diasporic” actors. 
Underlying this semantic change is the hunch that migrants and geographically mobile per-
sons and those with whom they associate may be engaged in sustained and continuous 
cross-border practices. So the story is not simply about migration and development – but 
about transnationalisation. 
Various agents have repositioned themselves locally in the global changes since the late 
1980s. Both public policies and rhetoric changed. A prominent example for the transformed 
political semantics is the discursive and institutional changes the People’s Republic of China 
has implemented. Discursively, the slogan to “serve the country” (wei guo fuwu) replaced the 
previous motto of “return to serve” (huiguo fuwu) (Cheng Xi in Nyíri 2001: 637). Such rhetoric 
has been complemented by public policy changes. Again, examples are easy to spot, includ-
ing adaptations through mechanisms such as dual citizenship for emigrants and immigrants 
(Faist 2007), voting rights for absentees, tax incentives for citizens abroad, and cooptation of 
migrant organisations by local, regional and state governments for development cooperation. 
Instead of permanent return migration, temporary returns, visits and other forms of transac-
tions have moved to the centre of attention. Thus, in recent years the notion of migrants’ re-
turn as an asset of development has been complemented by the idea that even if there is no 
eventual return, the commitment of migrants living abroad could be tapped, not only, for ex-
ample, through hometown associations but also through informal “diaspora knowledge net-
works” (Meyer, working paper; Barré et al. 2003), that is, networks of scientists and R&D 
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personnel, business networks of innovative start-ups (cf. Rauch 2001) and networks of pro-
fessionals working for multinational companies (Kuznetsov 2006). States, development 
agencies and international organizations try to support the circulatory mobility of persons 
engaged. The keyword is “temporary return”: Examples are UNESCO’s TOKTEN or IOM’s 
Migration and Development in Africa (MIDA) programs, which send migrants as experts back 
to countries of origin for short periods of time. And, of course, governments try to tap into the 
activities of hometown associations, although – seen only in terms of financial remittances – 
it is a small fraction, compared to remittances within kinship groups. A prominent example is 
the Mexican tres-por-uno (3x1) program, in which each “migradollar” sent by migrants from 
abroad is complemented by three dollars from various governmental levels. More recently, 
banks have joined the fray and announced 4x1 programs. The examples given suggest that 
states and organizations have started to build programs on obligations and commitments felt 
by migrants towards home institutions. To use Albert Hirschman’s terms, soico-political loy-
alty is used after geographical exit to exert not economic and sometimes political voice.4 
Much of the semantics focuses on community. The two most fashionable terms are “dias-
pora” and “transnational communities”. There is an interesting difference: “diaspora” is used 
frequently in the development discourse, “transnational communities” in transnationalist lit-
erature. Both terminologies refer to “communities without propinquity” (Faist 2000). Such 
communities are not primarily built upon geographical closeness but on a series of social and 
symbolic ties which connect ethnic, religious and professional diasporas. Yet the notions of 
diaspora and transnational community need to be unbundled and even rejected in order to 
get closer to a systematic analysis. Rogers Brubaker cogently observed that the “universali-
zation of the diaspora, paradoxically, means the disappearance of the diaspora” (Brubaker 
2005: 3). In recent decades there has been a telling change of meaning. First, in the “classi-
cal” meaning diaspora referred to forced migration and violent dispersal, nowadays it de-
notes any kind of migration, hence the talk of labour diaspora, trade diaspora, business dias-
pora, and refugee diasporas (Cohen 1997). Second, in the classical way diaspora implied a 
return to an imagined or real homeland, nowadays simply some sort of sustained ties back to 
the home country, and in post-modern usage even lateral ties – that is, ties not only from 
emigration to one immigration country but connectivity all over the globe. Third, in the old 
meaning diaspora referred to various forms of diaspora segregation in the immigration coun-
try, in the new meaning a sort of culturally pluralist boundary maintenance in the host country 
                                               
4
 See Hirschman (1970) on a theory of exit and voice, mediated by loyalty. 
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(e.g. Gilroy 1993). While these are interesting shifts in meaning, the term diaspora – as well 
as transnational community – is too restrictive a term, which imagines a rather homogeneous 
cross-border social formation. It repeats the same mistake as much migration scholarship 
which assumes a rather homogenous national, ethnic or religious groupings. 
Transnational social formations and a systematic transnational approach is an alternative 
(see working papers by Glick Schiller, Pries, and Amélina). Transnational formations – also: 
fields, spaces – consist of combinations of ties and their contents, positions in networks and 
organisations, and networks of organisations that cut across the borders of at least two na-
tional states. In other words, the term refers to sustained and continuous pluri-local transac-
tions crossing state borders. There are various ways to conceptualize transnational social 
formations, which can be thought to be part of more general societal configurations. Two 
prominent ones are fields and spaces – the first one refers to the inner logic of social action 
and can be extended to systemic approaches, the second one to the spatial dimension of 
social life. A commonality is that they aim to overcome “methodological territorialism” 
(Scholte 2000: 56), that is, conflating society, state and territory. And they are meant to over-
come also the conflation of society, state and nation, “methodological nationalism” (Wimmer 
and Glick Schiller 2003).  
The newest wave of the migration-development nexus raises a couple of challenges to 
transnational approaches. Here, I want to sketch three challenges. First, we definitely need 
to include migrant organisations and associations (cf. Moja 2005), such as hometown asso-
ciations (cf. Salzbrunn, working paper). But we also need to look at the spaces in between 
associations, organisations and communities. Second, we can see a disjuncture between 
development studies on the one hand and migrant incorporation studies on the other hand, 
with the former emphasizing the South, and the latter being almost exclusively concerned 
with integration issues in the OCED-North. And third, while there has been some discussion 
on remittances alleviating poverty but strengthening overall inequality in emigration region, 
little attention has been devoted to the public policy mechanisms which could contribute to 
equality and social citizenship. 
 
(1) Methodological Rigour 
Most empirical studies on transnationalisation and development from a sociological or an-
thropological viewpoint focus on association and organizations, a line of research which 
needs to be continued (e.g. Smith 2006). Such studies need to be complemented by those 
looking at the “spaces in between associations”, that is transactions criss-crossing multiple 
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associations, networks forming within associations, and non-organized engagement. Meth-
odologically, the exhortation of transnational approaches “follow the flow of persons, money, 
ideas and so forth” has not really been taken very seriously, contrary to most announce-
ments. A more systematic network approach, not only in the metaphorical sense is neces-
sary. And there are models of how to do it. Taking multi-sited fieldwork seriously – that is, 
simultaneous research in locations – would mean to follow financial or other transactions in 
tracing lateral connectivities to other immigration and emigration regions. A case at hand is 
the five-year study by Valentina Mazzucato and her colleagues in tracing transactions involv-
ing persons, groups and organisations in the case of networks of Ghanaian migrants located 
in Amsterdam back to locations in Ghana and in other regions of the world (Mazzucato et al. 
2007). Such a methodological approach does not presume concepts of world society which 
presuppose too much unity and systemic differentiation. In sum, exploring transnational con-
nectivities through multi-sited fieldwork enables us to look at the great variety of societal 
forms. In particular, it allows us to trace the combination of a high degree of local clustering 
with a relatively low average path distance between nodes and hubs, which are located in 
different states.  
Networks can be built around various categorical distinctions, such as ethnicity, race, gender, 
schooling, professional training, political affiliation, and sexual preference. Ethnicity consti-
tutes a particularly vexing issue in transnational studies. On the one hand a transnational 
approach should be able to overcome the “ethnic” bias inherent in much migration scholar-
ship. The fallacy is to label migrants immediately by “ethnic” or “national” categories. Often 
scholars presuppose prematurely that categories such as Turks, Brazilians and so forth mat-
ter a lot, since they do in public discourse. On the other hand, methods should be able to 
trace actually existing ethnic social formations, such as networks of reciprocity, which are of 
great importance, for example, in informal transfer systems of financial remittances. This 
means to turn the issue of the importance of ethnicity into an empirical question.  
Under-researched are also linkages between informal networks and formal organisations. 
Sometimes, for example, village associations celebrating cultural practices from the “home-
land” change function: In the case of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia there are “old 
linkages, new networks”. Village associations (shetuan) also function as an arena for busi-
nesspersons planning to invest in certain parts of China (Liu 1998). While Overseas Chinese 
entrepreneurs’ foremost considerations in deciding on China investment are profitability and 
economic opportunities available, it is in village associations that ties based on place of ori-
gin, kinship and dialect become useful as a foundation of establishing personal relationships 
(guanxi). Cultural affinities can facilitate effective personal and business relationships, and so 
Working Papers – Center on Migration, Citizenship and Development 
 13 
do play an important part in directing a substantial amount of investment and charitable 
money to the People’s Republic of China (qiaoxiang).  
 
(2) Incorporation and Development 
So far, incorporation and development studies are disjointed, even in transnational studies. 
Studies either take the perspective of the country or region, in which immigrants live, and 
deal from a transnational angle with issues of incorporation into labour markets, housing, 
education and cultural pluralism, but also social security, state security, wage differentials, 
and so forth. Or studies deal with the effects of transnational ties on home countries, villages, 
formations from which migrants originate, such as demographic dynamics, remittance flows, 
and cultural impacts and often involving an analysis of transnational flows. The former stud-
ies, preoccupied with effects on immigration regions, have entered into a dialogue with as-
similation and multiculturalism perspectives, and the latter, focusing on emigration regions, 
with development studies. Yet the two areas are awkward dance partners. For example, 
studies have found in the case of immigrants from Mexico, the Dominican Republic and Co-
lombia in the USA that transnational immigrant organizations’ members are older, better-
established, and possess above-average levels of education (Portes et al. 2007). This could 
be interpreted, depending on one’s conceptual predisposition, as transnationalism and as-
similation not being opposites, or as a strong transnational orientation indicating a specific 
path of incorporation.  
However, if not carried onwards, such discussions miss the essence of a transnational ap-
proach, which is not only relevant for viewing incorporation in national terms. This is clearly 
visible in two-way flows. From an integrated North-South perspective one has to look not 
only at remittances but also at potential “reverse remittances.” There are indeed empirical 
findings of “reverse remittances” or two way flows: They can be important especially at the 
beginning stages of migration of persons or groups, for example to help (undocumented) 
migrants to get papers and thus to legalize their stay.5  
                                               
5
 In a systems-perspective two-way flows also have to be seen in a long-term historical perspective covering 
several centuries. There was a co-constitution of what we nowadays call North and South. From early colonialism 
onwards many resources flowed from South to North – flows of information, knowledge, economic resources were 
also critical for regions such as Europe; the most obvious linkage being migration from colonies or former colonies 
to centres. In turn, such flows helped to create the very transnational remittance flows from North to South we are 
looking at nowadays. 
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It is questionable whether terms such as immigrant integration or incorporation are able to 
capture how two-way flows shape associational life in between emigration and immigration 
regions (cf. Fauser, working paper; Ostergaard-Nielsen, working paper). They are valid per-
spectives, of course, centring on regions of destination and origin. Nonetheless, the in-
between transactions constitute social facts sui generis. Yet we have not yet found an ap-
propriate terminology to deal with these social facts. Simply rejecting methodological nation-
alism is not enough. 
 
(3) Public Policy, Networks and Inequality 
Many studies look positively at remittances – financial, knowledge and social – because they 
may reduce poverty or even eradicate it and contribute to economic growth (see Mundt, 
working paper; Zoomers, working paper). However, there is almost no discussion of the 
mechanisms of how this may work – it is almost as if an “invisible hand” would transform re-
mittances into poverty reduction and economic growth. Needless to say, this is a very myopic 
view of the public policy relevance of remittances. If tying transnational migration to global 
social inequality, then remittances must be examined in their relevance for social policy. 
Seen in this way, they do not constitute explicit social policies, of course, but they form a 
basis for fostering social solidarity among citizens. This thought is not as farfetched as it may 
seem at first sight. Comparative historians of welfare states tell us that “late industrializers” in 
the sense of Alexander Gershenkron, such as the Nordic countries and East Asia (Wong 
2006), developed more universal social policies than “early industrializers” such as the 
United Kingdom. Yet, in the recent past targeted in contrast to universal social policies were 
the foundation of policies which international organisations favoured in the case of develop-
ing countries. Such policies failed miserably, in particular structural adjustment policies and 
the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). Therefore, the crucial policy question is how 
to fit remittances into universal social policies. How can remittances be factored into what a 
recent publication by the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development (UN-
RISD) calls “developmental welfare”? Social policy and social rights are not something that 
might merely evolve after a certain level of development has been reached. Rather “social 
policy is a key instrument for economic and social development” (UNRISD 2007: 2). Since 
there is no simple remittance-development-nexus, we need to look at policies which can 
forge social solidarity and are thus based on social citizenship. All great theorists of societal 
membership – from Aristotle, Cicero, J.S. Mill, Hannah Arendt, T.H. Marshall – have agreed 
that in order to participate fully in public life, persons need to be in a certain socio-economic 
and political position – in Marshall’s tradition we may call it social citizenship; more recently 
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the term “capabilities” has been introduced by Amartya Sen to capture the same thought 
(Marshall 1973, Sen 1999).  
In sum, there is, first, an interesting nexus between remittances, social policy and develop-
ment with remittances constituting a sort of intervening variable because they are an expres-
sion of diffuse solidarity and generalized reciprocity upon which any kind of social policy has 
to be built. Second, only by integrating transnational migrants into policy circuits on various 
governance levels can such potentials be realized. Therefore, the uncritical celebration of 
diasporas and transnational communities in isolation from other agents by both neo-liberal 
and transnationalist-cum-communitarian views may be seriously misguided. At the very least, 
we need to analyse the social policy potential inherent in transnational with respect to state 
agencies on various levels, non-governmental organisations and economic organisations 
such as firms. 
 
Why Now? Structural Factors Shaping the New Enthusiasm  
The last broad issue I would like to touch upon today is why the migration-development 
nexus and migrants as new transnational agents of development have been introduced now 
and how it fits into the changing paradigms and concepts of thinking on development. Three 
topics need to be considered: first, the discursive constitution of the relationships between 
state vs. civil society & community and market vs. civil society; second, geopolitical changes 
since the end of the Cold War; and third, migration control as an implicit factor driving circula-
tory migration. 
 
(1) Changing Concepts of Development: Statehood, Market and Transnational Civil Society 
& Community 
The criticism of the “civil religion” of development from the 1980s onwards has called into 
question the idea of a homogeneous third world, the idea of progress (Rist 1996), and most 
important for our question, state-civil society & community relations (Schuurman 2000). The 
changing conceptualizations of state, civil society & community and market over the past 50 
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years in the development debate may signal a transnationalisation of these terms. This can 
be usefully illustrated in the relationship between, first, state and civil society & community, 
and second, market and civil society & community.6 Crucially, development thinking has 
moved from a focus on the national state to more emphasis on local government and interna-
tional institutions. Therefore, we have to broaden our concepts and speak not simply of the 
state but of statehood on various levels. Moreover, as the enthusiasm on diasporas and 
transnational communities indicates, civil society has also to be conceptualized as transna-
tional civil society (cf. Raghuram, working paper). 
a) Statehood and Civil Society: While in modernization theory we found a strong belief in the 
crucial role of the national state7, this belief was called into question after the 1960s and 
1970s, when international development organisations focused more on “market” as a princi-
ple and as diffuse notions such as community and of civil society moved to be the lodestars 
of development. The epitome of the market was the by now dated “Washington Consensus” 
while community and civil society – often used interchangeably – entered discussions in the 
context of strategies such as basic needs. It has been in this context that migrants were in-
troduced in the 1990s as a civil society or community actor, either as individuals remitting 
funds or as migrant associations in the form of “diaspora” of “transnational communities”. It is 
therefore no coincidence that organised groups such as hometown associations in Mexico, 
returnee associations in Jamaica, or charitable foundations in Egypt have gained importance 
in discourse and policy making. In short, over the decades, the central role of the national 
state has become de-emphasised in favour not only of the market but also of civil society and 
community. Equally noteworthy is the now often made distinction between the central and 
local state. In the face of decentralization and attendant slogans such as ownership and 
stakeholdership, local governments, along with civil society and community, assumed a 
greater role. The migration-development nexus proved to be no exception. In immigration 
states such as France vis-à-vis West African states the aforementioned idea of co-
development in phase 3 of the migration-development nexus sees migrants as their own de-
velopment agents regarding sending countries: Migrants and their diasporas alleviate poverty 
and help to solve conflicts, especially if local governments work with diaspora groups and 
deliver better results. Examples can be found in France and Spain.8 In general, the focus on 
                                               
6
 Here I use the terms civil society and community interchangeably since I refer to their diffuse usage in public 
discourses. 
7
 See phase 1 of the migration-development nexus above. 
8
 It is often forgotten that the idea of local government is decidedly western; one of the conceptual foundations is 
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local governments and diasporas has come to be especially relevant in cases where national 
states in Third World countries have failed to establish territorial domination, rule of law, insti-
tutionalize democracy and start a “sustained” economic development. Hope is invested in 
non-governmental organisations and local government in a synergetic collaboration with di-
asporas.  
b) Market and Transnational Civil Society: Not only have statehood-civil society relations 
changed but also the linkage between market and civil society. Communities or civil society 
are becoming more and more a complement to liberal economic approaches in the era of the 
post-Washington consensus. Two elements abound: liberal economic thought on the one 
hand, and participatory approaches, on the other hand. Liberal economic thought would sug-
gest that migrants are their own best development agents. A recent UK House of Commons 
report touting diasporas as development agents approvingly cites John Kenneth Galbraith. 
He described migration as “the oldest action against poverty” (Galbraith 1962). A second 
element is usually to be found as well, participatory and grassroots approaches. In this way 
“voice” in combination with “exit” and continued “loyalty”, that is, commitment of transnational 
migrants to regions of origin is compatible with the “market citizen”, who, by the way, is not 
necessarily a political citizen. Participatory approaches, as expressed, for example, by re-
ports of the United Nations Development Organisation,9 focus on collective remittances. Not 
surprisingly, migrants’ collectives in all forms, hometown associations, diaspora knowledge 
networks, businesspersons’ networks and even religious congregations (see Tonah, working 
paper) are now sought after by governments seeking to establish – as usual – their own in-
terest groups. Obviously, the study of transnational civil society is not to be restricted to non-
governmental organisations (cf. Ballard, working paper). 
 
(2) Geopolitical Changes: Diaspora’s New Role 
                                                                                                                                                   
Tocqueville who sees the local level as the cradle and the center of democracy. 
9
 The Human Development Report of 1991 put it this way: “the basic objective of human development is to 
enlarge people’s choices to make development more democratic and participatory. These choices should include 
access to income and employment opportunities, education and health, and a clean and safe physical environ-
ment. Each individual should also have the opportunity to participate fully in community decisions and to enjoy 
human, economic and political freedoms.” (UNDP 2002: 1) 
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The political opportunity structure of voice after geographical exit changed dramatically after 
the end of the Cold War.10 In the 1960s lobbying activities of diasporas mainly took the form 
of protests against the domestic policies of governments in the homelands (Armstrong 1976). 
It was Cold War rivalries that largely dictated the effectiveness of the diaspora campaigns 
against the government in the homeland (Shain and Barth 2003). Nowadays, although na-
tional liberation diasporas still ongoing (Kurds, Tamils, Palestinians and so forth), the activi-
ties have become more varied; diasporas, for example, have portrayed themselves as carri-
ers of democratization. And even in the context of armed conflict and civil wars diasporas 
have assumed a more visible role. Violent conflicts made some countries to collapse totally, 
making them ungovernable, such as countries located in the Great Lakes, the Horn of Africa 
and Afghanistan. In these cases the activities of immigration countries and development or-
ganisations have focused on conflict mediation in addition to armed intervention (von Car-
lowitz 2004). 
 
(3) The Coupling of Migration Control and Development Aid 
Paradoxically, restrictive migration policies may be conducive to financial remittances and 
transnational kinship groups. Contemporary international borders are much more akin to 
sieves than to medieval brick walls. Their principal function is to protect the integrity of the 
socio-economic, demographic and cultural integrity of the population which lies behind them. 
One important measure is to filter unacceptable or illegitimate migrants and welcoming those 
which increase the competitiveness of the economy. To paraphrase Ari Zolberg, the hewers 
of wood and the drawers of water are implicitly “wanted but not welcome” (Zolberg 1986). By 
contrast, those regarded as highly skilled migrants who transmit knowledge and foreign in-
vestments are not only wanted but also quite welcome. The migration-development link is 
usually mentioned in its function to reduce the propensities for migration to Europe. Coupled 
with such controls are policies making development aid to states in the European periphery 
conditional upon their willingness to control undocumented migration (Faist and Ette 2007). 
In other words, emigration countries need to show their willingness to control illegal migration 
to immigration countries in order to get development aid. A good example for such condition-
ality is Morocco, which partly depends on the EU for financial contributions. Yet these poli-
                                               
10
 Of crucial importance have been slowly evolving systems changes, for example, in the People’s Republic of 
China since 1978. It has led to a re-orientation of the relations to her diaspora in order to attract foreign invest-
ment and to induce knowledge transfer, mostly by the Overseas Chinese. 
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cies, provided they are half-way effective, may produce unintended consequences. For ex-
ample, the implicit migration policy logic of remittance and development discussions is that 
migrants should keep migrating, in a rather restrictive migration control configuration that 
sets migrants up to remit: Family members are left behind. This is so because restrictive im-
migration policy towards some categories of mobiles, especially towards illegal ones, pro-
duces ruptured transnational families. Then remittances may become even more relevant! 
Seen from a functional point of view, the public policies that differ towards undocumented 
migrants and the highly-skilled, restrictive in the former and welcoming in the latter case, are 
important for sustaining the same kind of effect, namely the circulation of persons and other 
resources. 
 
Conclusion 
To sum up, my introductory reflections represent a very preliminary overview of the issues 
we shall discuss at this conference. Occlusions and silences abound. For example, I have 
barely mentioned the role of armed conflicts, civil wars and peace-building on political 
change. Also, I have not even touched on different notions of development to be found 
among different categories of agents. Not only development experts are mobile and re-
searchers who study migration and development – and looking around in this arena, obvi-
ously quite a few distinguished scholars belong to this circle – but also migrants themselves. 
And, perhaps most important of all, I have not yet introduced what one could call the sym-
bolically highly charged numbers’ game, which characterizes development cooperation. For 
example, we may ask: What is the significance of repeating the statement that financial re-
mittances are x-times higher than the sums allotted to official development aid (ODA) – con-
sidering the fact that ODA is not really regarded as really successful in overcoming social 
problems such as poverty? Does the repetition signal the continuation of a logic which can-
not be repeated in the case of ODA, for all the obvious and known problems discussed for 
decades? Why would the mechanisms underlying “development” change all of a sudden if 
we substituted bearers of hope such as political elites or women with migrants?  
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